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To Appear in a volume in honor of Peter Achinstein edited by Gregory J Morgan 
 
Evidence, External Validity and Explanatory Relevance 
Nancy Cartwright1 







When does one fact speak for another? That is the problem of evidential 
relevance. Peter Achinstein’s answer, in brief: Evidential relevance = explanatory 
relevance.2 My own recent work investigates evidence for effectiveness 
predictions, which are at the core of the currently heavily mandated evidence-
based policy and practice (EBPP): predictions of the form ‘Policy treatment T 
implemented as, when and how it would be implemented by us will result in 
targeted outcome O.’ RCTs, or randomized controlled trials, for T and O are taken 
to be the gold standard for evidence for effectiveness predictions. I question this: 
Not just whether they are gold-standard evidence, but more, How can they be 
evidence at all? What makes them relevant to the truth of the prediction that T 
will work for us?   
 
I am going to follow Achinstein’s lead here and suppose that evidential 
relevance = explanatory relevance, where A is explanatorily relevant to B just in 
case A is an ineliminable part of a correct explanation of B, or the reverse or A is 
indirectly relevant to B: There is some common fact that is an ineliminable part 
of correct explanations for A and B. I shall argue: 
 
1. It’s not evidence for us without evidence that it’s evidence. 
2. Evidential relevance is a conditional relation: E is evidence for H 
conditional on the non-shared factors that fill out explanations for E and 
H. Finding these involves a horizontal search. 
3. To get shared explanatory elements we need a vertical search, up and 
down the ladder of abstraction. If we haven’t climbed the right ladder in 
the right way, an RCT may not show what we think it does.  
 
It follows from my discussion that RCTs cannot play anything like the central 
evidential role for effectiveness predictions that they are standardly awarded in 
EBPP literature. 
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I begin with some terminology, some assumptions, and some simplifying 
procedures. First, the fact that effectiveness predictions are predictions should 
not put us off an explanatory relevance account. Just suppose that the 
predictions are true. Then look for explanatory relevance.  
 
Second, I adopt the probabilistic theory of causality. I suppose that for each 
effect-type at a time t, Ot, and for each time t’ before t, there is a set of factors 
{C1t’,…,Cnt’} – the causes at t’ of O at t – whose values in combination fix the 
objective chance at t’ that O takes value o for any o in its allowed range. A causal 
structure, CSt’(Ot), for Ot is  such a set along with the related objective chances for 
all values of Ot for all combinations of allowed values, Ljt’, of the causes in the 
set: Prob(Ot = o/Ljt’). For simplicity I will usually suppress time and other indices 
and also restrict attention to two-valued variables. So a causal structure looks 
like this: CSt’(Ot) = <{C1t’,…,Cnt’}, {Prob(Ot/L1t’),…,Prob(Ot/Lmt’) }>.  
 
Third, I follow the EBPP literature and concentrate on the effect size of T for O in 
a population: Prob(O/T) – Prob(O/-T).3 
 
Fourth, I restrict attention to predictions about the effects of policies on 
populations and not on single units.  
 
Fifth, I consider only positive relevance since that fits in a simple way within 
Achinstein’s explanatory account.  
 
Sixth, I concentrate on cases where E is indirectly relevant to H because these 
are the most complicated cases.  
 
Finally, for simplicity I assume that the evidence claims in question are well-
confirmed – we can reasonably take them as true.  
 
2. Relevance is conditional on unshared factors 
 
The relevance relation I focus on is objective: One fact (E) bears on the truth of 
another (H). This relation holds between facts because of the way nature and 
society operate; it does not depend on our knowledge of this operation. There 
are corresponding epistemic notions – like our reasoned judgments about what 
is relevant to what. These do depend on the state of our knowledge and a variety 
of other factors as well, such as time and resource constraints or level and type 
of expertise. Objective relevance is important for policy deliberation predictions: 
Gathering, discovering, and surveying facts are all costly. We’d like to confine our 
attentions to facts that matter to the truth of the policy prediction. 
 
‘Bears on the truth of’ can seem hopelessly vague. So there are various well-
known attempts to explicate it with more familiar notions. One takes relevance 
to be some kind of causal relation. That’s too narrow. So too are various kinds of 
probabilistic relations: There just aren’t enough of these in the world to account 




for all the obvious evidential relevance.4 Moreover, relying on probabilities puts 
the cart before the horse when it comes to the needs of estimating if a policy will 
work. Achinstein’s explanatory relevance by contrast fits the bill nicely.  
 
Why should explanatory relevance be a good stand-in for the more abstract 
concept ‘bears on the truth of’? My answer is a mix of views of Achinstein and of 
my own. Just as the relevance relation aimed for is objective, so must the 
explanatory relation be in order to serve as a marker for relevance. ‘Explanation’ 
as I use it, then, doesn’t mean something that has the right form and is proffered 
as an explanation; it means something that is an explanation. There will be 
many of these, some of them nested, which is why, as I argue in Sections 4 and 
5, we need good vertical searches to find the widest scope of evidential 
relevance a result can have. 
 
Achinstein has been criticized for using explanatory relevance because this 
concept itself, it is argued, is in need of explication. I disagree that we need an 
explication for the task at hand.5 There are a host of different ‘thick’ relations in 
nature we label ‘causal’ (like pushing, feeding, lapping up, mailing,…). So too 
there are a host of relations that we lump together under the label ‘explains’ 
when explanation serves as a guide to ‘bears on the truth of’. The fact that we 
cannot give an interesting non-circular explication of ‘explains’ as an objective 
relation  does not mean that we cannot recognize it when we see it – Newton’s 
laws explain Kepler’s and my taking an aspirin  explains my headache getting 
better. Nor does it mean that we cannot take certain claims to be generally true 
of it.  
 
There is good reason why the Achinstein slogan should work for EBPP. To start 
with, a correct explanation is always evidentially relevant to its explanandum 
and vice versa. The first follows trivially if one adopts a deductive nomological 
account of explanation since the explanans cannot hold without the 
explanandum doing so as well. But, even if one follows GEM Anscombe (1993) in 
maintaining that an explanans can be enough – it can be as full an explanation 
as nature allows – without the explanandum obtaining, nevertheless the 
occurrence of the explanans is undoubtedly evidentially relevant to the 
occurrence of the explanandum. The converse is trivial since ‘explanation’ is 
meant to be ‘correct explanation’.  
 
Indirect evidence is harder. E is (indirectly) relevant to H if there is a correct 
explanation for H that shares a common element, X, with some correct 
explanation for E. X + XuE correctly explains E and X + XuH correctly explains H.6 E 
is evidence that X obtains. But obtaining X cannot be part of a correct 
explanation for H unless XuH obtains. If XuH is not the case, then X and XuH cannot 
be a correct explanation for H – it doesn’t matter how well-confirmed X is. The 
relevance of E’s truth to the truth of H flows through X and it can only do that 
given XuH. E’s truth is of no matter at all to H’s where XuH fails.  
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 For Anchinstein’s views on why purely probabilistic characterizations of evidence 
do not work, see inter alia Achinstein 2004, 1996, 1981. 
5
 For Anchinstein’s views on this issue see especially Anchinstein 1981. 
6
 Subscript ‘u’ marks the unshared elements of the explanations. 
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Suppose your interest is in whether H is true. But you know that XuH is false.7 
Would you pay to learn E? No. Or take a stock philosopher’s case: You are asked 
to predict the color of a bird in the river. Is the bevy of observed white swans 
relevant? It is if ‘All swans are white’ is part of the explanation of both your bird’s 
color and theirs. But if you are told that your bird is certainly not a swan, all those 
observations of swan color are worthless to you. 
 
So: When the topic is evidence for policy predictions, the relevant concept of 
relevance is a conditional one: The relevance of a fact E that would have a 
shared explanatory element with H were H to be true is conditional on the 
obtaining of the unshared portion of the explanation H would have. Moreover, 
the epistemic probability awarded to E being relevant should be no higher than 
the epistemic probability that appropriate unshared factors obtain. 
  
 
3. External validity and the need for horizontal search 
 
An ideal RCT is a study in which the population in the study, φ, divides into two 
groups that are identical with respect to all features casually relevant to the 
targeted outcome, O, except for the policy treatment, T, and its downstream 
consequences. Suppose the probability of O is greater in the T group than the –T 
group. Where can we go from there?   
 
Under the probabilistic theory of causality, the values of a full set of O’s causes 
fix the objective chance that O takes any value in its range.  That’s what prompts 
the attention to the conditional probabilities from the causal structure for φ, 
Prob(O/K&T) > P(O/K& –T), where K is an assignment of values to all the 
members of CSφ(O)  with the exception of T and its downstream effects. Whether 
T has a positive effect size in φ depends on the relative weights in φ of 
subpopulations in which T acts positively and those in which it acts negatively. 
 
A study is said to be externally valid when ‘the conclusion established in the 
study holds elsewhere’. Consider an ideal RCT for T,O on a large study population 
φ  that has a positive result:  
 
Study Conclusion (SC:)  Prob(O/T) > Prob (O/–T) in φ.  
 
The study has external validity for target population θ if  
 
Target Conclusion (TC): Prob(O/T) > Prob (O/–T) in θ. 
 
(Recall, θ describes the target population supposing the implementation that 
would in fact occur given the policy in question.)  
 
When is SC evidence for TC?  
 
Since neither SC explains TC nor the reverse, if SC is to be evidence for TC there 
must be some shared part in their separate explanations.  The explanation for 
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 I suppose here that X would not figure in any other correct explanation for H were H 
to obtain. 
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the successful RCT results in φ under the probabilistic theory of causality look 
like this for some specific causal structure, CS(O), and some specific set of 
causally homogeneous subpopulations from CS(O), K = {…,Kj,… }, 
 
Study Conclusion Explanation (SCE):   
SCE1: The causal structure for O of φ is CS(O). 
SCE2: For KJ  in K Prob(O/KJ & T) > Prob(O/KJ & –T ) according to CS(O). 
SCE3: The possible negative effects of T on O in other subpopulations are 
not enough to outweigh this increase.8  
 
The explanations for the predicted hypothesis TC are the same in form and must 
refer to the very same causal structure and the very same causally 
homogeneous subpopulations if there are to be shared factors: 
 
 
Target Conclusion Explanation (TCE):   
TCE1: The causal structure for O of θ is CS(O).  
TCE2: Some member(s), KJ,KJ’,… of K are  subpopulation of θ. 
TCE3: For these KJ,  Prob(O/KJ & T) > Prob(O/KJ & –T ) according to CS(O). 
TCE4: The possible negative effects of T on O in other subpopulations of θ 
are not enough to outweigh the increase due to these. 
 
Since most of the claims in both explanations are indexed to the population, the 
only shared element is the claim that CS(O) implies that Prob(O/KJ & T) > 
Prob(O/KJ & –T ) for the KJ of TCE3. It is this– and only this– one shared 
explanatory element that makes the RCT result relevant to the policy prediction. 
But it is shared only supposing that TCE is a correct explanation for the 
prediction about θ. That is, the RCT is explanatorily relevant, and thus 
evidentially relevant, only relative to the truth of TCE1,2,&4. What then should be 
required for the RCT to be accepted as evidence? My dictum: It’s not evidence 
for us unless we have evidence that it’s evidence. That means having evidence 
for TCE1,2,&4. And what reasons do we have to accept these? 
 
To start, what supports TC1 – that φ has the same causal structure for O as φ? 
Common causal structures are not all that typical. The refurbished Cuisinart 
Classic 4-slice toaster that I almost bought for £41.46 has a different causal 
structure than does the Dualit 3-slice stainless steel toaster at £158.03, which 
has a different structure again from the new Krups expert black and stainless 
steel toaster at £44.99. Perhaps you think – as many economists and medical 
RCT advocates seem to – that your two populations are more likely to share 
causal structure than are the toasters on offer in Oxford. That’s fine. But for 
EBPP you should have good evidence-backed reason for that. 
 
Supposing that the two populations do have a common causal structure, what 
assures that some of the very subpopulations KJ of φ in which Prob(O/KJ & T) > 
Prob(O/KJ & –T ) are subpopulations of θ? The mix of causal factors that obtain 
shifts all the time, both across situations and across time. Worse, no matter 
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what mix was there before, in implementing policy we all too often alter that 
mix. Consider the California class-size reduction program. Reduced class sizes 
did not improve educational outcomes because the program was rolled out over 
a short time; the need for teachers doubled within a year but the availability of 
trained teachers did not. Teaching quality went down, offsetting the good 
influence of class size.9 
 
Finally, why suppose that were T to increase the probability of O in θ as 
predicted, that would be due to the positive effects in the shared subpopulations 
rather than in some subpopulations of θ not shared with φ?  
 
These questions need answers, and for EBPP, answers reasonably underpinned 
by empirical and theoretical support. One cannot just plop SC on the table and 
say that it is relevant to TC. Whether it is relevant depends on common 
explanatory factors, and presuming that common factors obtain requires good 
evidence. ‘It can’t count as evidence unless there’s evidence that it’s evidence’. 
 
Clearly this dictum can create a regress. That, however, is the human condition. 
We have to stop somewhere. But it should be somewhere reasonable and 
defensible. Consider CCTV cameras.10 Are they working? A glance at the monitor 
is generally enough to be reasonably certain, despite the fact that in heist 
movies elaborate techniques are undertaken to make the monitors lie.  For 
relevance, too, we need reasonable and defensible stopping points for the chain 
of evidence that shows that evidence offerings are evidence. Consider for a 
moment not the relevance but the credibility of evidence offerings. Where 
detailed scientific argument and experiment are involved, this is going to be hard 
for policy analysts and practitioners to judge. That is why institutions like the 
Cochrane and Campbell Collaborations or the What Works Clearing House have 
been set up. If they give a study result high marks, it is generally reasonable for 
a practitioner to take that on faith.11 
 
What then of the evidence for the relevance of SC for TC? Sometimes we can 
assemble some body of facts that are reasonably well attested and that provide 
good reasons in favor of claims like TCE1,2,&4. But it is hard. And the very cases 
in which one most wants to perform an RCT are the cases where there will be 
least evidence that a positive RCT result for the policy treatment is evidence that 
the policy will work for us. RCTs are touted as gold standard because only they 
‘control for unknowns’, for the factors in the causal structure for O that we don’t 
know are there and hence can’t check explicitly are distributed the same in the 
two groups.  
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 Elsewhere I describe this case in terms of capacities. The same kinds of problems 
arise in both cases. 
10
 See Pawson and Tilley 1997 for a good use of the example of CCTV cameras in 
parking lots discouraging car theft to argue the need for what I here call ‘horizontal 
search’ and to show how understanding the mechanism at work can help with that. 
11
 I think, however, that negative judgements by these organizations are often made 
on bad premises. They tend to presume that trusting to pure method is always better 
than supposing substantive knowledge claims. That, for example, is why RCTs are 
gold standard and econometric modelling doesn’t get a look in. See Cartwright 2007 
for more details. 
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So RCTs come into their own when we suspect that a good many factors in the 
causal structure for the study population are unknown. But then how are we 
supposed to produce evidence that those very unknown factors are causal 
factors according to the causal structure for θ? And that θ has some of the same 
causally homogeneous subpopulations in which T is positive for O as does φ? 
Finally, how do we estimate that in other subpopulations of θ, T won’t have 
enough negative effects to decrease the chance of O there? The very same 
epistemic gaps that make the RCT the method of choice also make results 
practically useless for prediction.  
 
The problems discussed in this section demand horizontal search. T can increase 
the probability of O in some mixes of causal factors and not in others; it can even 
decrease the probability in some while increasing it in others. A positive RCT 
result is relevant to a policy prediction only relative to assumptions about the 
mixes of factors operating in the study population and in the target population. 
To be justified in taking the RCT as evidence we need to gather information 
about what other factors operate with T in the two populations. That’s what I 
mean by a ‘horizontal search’. To increase the range of relevance of the RCT we 
also need a ‘vertical search’, which reviews causes across levels of abstraction. 
 
 
4. External validity and vertical search 
 
The causes in a causal structure can be more or less abstract; and structures 
involving factors at different levels of abstraction can all obtain at once. “The 
trajectories of bodies moving on a sphere subject only to inertia are great 
circles” is true; so too is “The trajectories of bodies moving on a sphere subject 
only to inertia are geodesics (i.e. the shortest distance between two points)”. 
They are equally true because on a sphere, a great circle is a geodesic.12 
Generally the higher the level of abstraction of a causal structure, the more 
widely it is shared across populations. For example, bodies on Euclidean planes 
subject only to inertia follow geodesics but not great circles. This matters for 
explanatory relevance. 
 
An easy way to get a grip on how it matters is to consider some examples. The 
first is from climate-change modeling, where development economists argue 
that many of the policies that can help alleviate harmful effects of climate 
change are things that should be done in developing countries anyway. This is 
the case of the Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition program (BINP) for providing 
pregnant women with nutritional counseling, with the idea that poor nutrition is 
not only due to poverty but also to ignorance, for instance to belief in ‘eating 
down’ during pregnancy. (White 2009) Of course knowledge by itself is not 
enough, resources are required too, so the counseling was joined by a 
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 I shall here be relatively cavalier about the metaphysics of properties. I treat 
abstract features and concrete ones both as real and I treat them as different features 
even if having one of these (the more concrete feature) is what constitutes having the 
more abstract one on any occasion. I take it that claims like this can be rendered. 
appropriately, though probably differently, in different metaphysical accounts of 
properties. 
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supplementary feeding program. This is the kind of factor that comes up in a 
horizontal search.  
 
An analysis by the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department found no 
significant impact on infants’ nutritional status. This despite the fact that the 
program had ‘worked’ elsewhere. What went wrong? 
 
A number of reasons suggest that the results elsewhere were not evidentially 
relevant to the success of the policy in Bangladesh. They might have been. It is 
natural to expect that explanations for the results elsewhere and for Bangladesh 
success would share an important common element: A general principle  
 
Principle 1: Better nutritional knowledge in mothers plus supplemental 
feeding improves the nutritional status of their children.  
 
In fact the two populations did not share this principle.  
 
The first reason for the lack of impact, it seems, is that there was ‘leakage’: In 
Bangladesh the food was often not used as a supplement but as a substitute, 
with the usual food allocation for that child passing to another member of the 
family. (Save the Children 2003) The principle ‘Better nutritional knowledge in 
mothers plus supplemental feeding improves children’s nutrition’ was true in the 
original successful cases but not in Bangladesh. A better candidate for a shared 
explanatory element is 
 
Principle 2: Better nutritional knowledge in mothers with sufficient 
resources to use that knowledge improves children’s nutrition. 
 
This principle uses concepts at a higher level of abstraction. In the successful 
cases the more concrete description ‘food supplied by the supplementary 
feeding program’ counted as an instance of the more abstract concept 
‘sufficient resources’, but not in Bangladesh. Not getting this straight is a failure 
of vertical search: A failure to identify the right level of abstraction to find 
common explanatory elements.  
 
A second reason for the lack of positive impact is also a problem with vertical 
search. 
 
The program targeted the mothers of young children. But mothers are 
frequently not the decision makers, and rarely the sole decision makers, 
with respect to the health and nutrition of their children. For a start, 
women do not go to market in rural Bangladesh; it is men who do the 
shopping. And for women in joint households – meaning they live with 
their mother-in-law – as a sizeable minority do, then the mother-in-law 
heads the women’s domain. Indeed, project participation rates are 
significantly lower for women living with their mother-in-law in more 
conservative parts of the country. (White 2009, 6) 
 
This suggests yet another vertical move to secure a shared principle: 
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Principle 3: Better nutritional knowledge results in better nutrition for a 
child in those who 
1. Have sufficient resources to use that knowledge to improve the child’s 
nutrition, 
2. Control what food is procured with those resources, 
3. Control how food gets dispensed, and 
4. Hold the child’s interests as central in performing 2. and 3. 
 
Just as supplementary food did not count as sufficient resources in the BINP, 
mothers in that program did not in general satisfy the more abstract descriptions 
in 2. and 3.  
 
The previous successes of the program are relevant to predictions about the 
BINP only relative to the vertical identification of mothers with the abstract 
descriptions in 2., 3., and 4. But not all of these identifications hold. So the 
previous successes are not evidentially relevant. For an RCT to be relevant, and 
to be justifiably taken as such, we need good reasons to back up the claims that 
the characteristics referred to in study conclusions, which are often fairly 
concrete, are the same as the characteristics appearing in principles shared 
across study and target populations, which are often relatively abstract. 
 
Consider another possible example, this from UK child-welfare policy. In many 
cases a child’s care-givers, though not legally compelled, are heavily 
encouraged, perhaps even badgered, into attending parenting classes. Consider 
in this context making fathers attend parenting classes.  
 
First, is ‘father’ to be instantiated by ‘biological father’ or, e.g. ‘male partner of 
the mother who lives in the household with the child’, or maybe ‘male care-
giver’? It may well be that the policy would be effective if the male care-givers or 
men living with the mother are the target but not biological fathers who are 
neither on site nor care-givers. If so, to focus on ‘being a father’ would be to 
move to too high a level of abstraction since only the more specific feature, 
‘male care-giver’ or ‘male partner of mother who shares the child’s household’, 
enters into a reasonably reliable principle.  
 
On the other hand ‘compelling father’ or ‘compelling male care-giver’ can 
simultaneously be too concrete. Different cultures in the UK have widely 
different views about the roles fathers should play in parenting. Compelling 
fathers to attend classes can fall under the more abstract description, ‘ensuring 
care-givers are better informed about ways to help the child’, in which case it 
could be expected to be positively effective for improving the child’s welfare. But 
it may also instantiate the more abstract feature ‘public humiliation’, in which 
case it could act oppositely. And of course it can fall under both at once. In any 
case, if the two more abstract features pull in opposite directions, there will be 
no reliable principle to formulate at the more concrete level involving ‘fathers’. 
Nor is this pull in opposite directions an unrealistic hypothesis.  We know from 
empirical research that there are varying outcomes associated with 
compelling/strongly encouraging parents to attend parenting classes and also 
that these are correlated with varying motivations. (Barlow et al. 2006) 
Unfortunately we do not yet have sufficient theoretical probing to explain the 





5. Troubles for vertical search 
 
To secure explanatory relevance in cases like the BINP, it is necessary first to 
find and defend a shared explanatory principle. This involves finding the right 
ladder of abstraction to climb and knowing just when to stop.13 But a principle 
can only be shared between study and target if it applies to both. So it is equally 
necessary to defend that what happens in the study and what is predicted to 
happen in the target instantiate the abstract concepts in the putatively shared 
principle. 
 
This is no easy matter since what in the concrete an abstract property consists in 
often differs dramatically from circumstance to circumstance. This problem 
arises regularly in economic climate mitigation and adaptation models (and 
many other economic models as well). Consider studies of how to change 
American insurance schemes to provide financial incentives for those living in 
high risk areas, like the chic Florida coast, to make their homes less prone to 
risk, for instance by changing the roof construction. (Cf., Kunreuther and Michel-
Kerjan 2009 plus references therein.) The models often rely on game theory 
assumptions that rational agents act to maximize their expected utility.. Here we 
have to worry about misplaced concretization of the abstract feature ‘utility’. The 
models typically take money to instantiate utility. But there is a good chance 
that the targeted agents – say rich owners of beach-front residences – will be 
more moved by the disruption to their domestic arrangements of having builders 
at work for months than by any contrary financial incentive that could 
realistically get built into an insurance scheme. 
 
The same problem of context dependence resurfaces when it comes to 
measurement, where we see a familiar trade-off: Shared principles require 
higher levels of abstraction; good measurement, lower. For good comparable 
measurements, we want specific operational procedures that are carried out in 
the same way each time the measurement is performed. By contract, the 
methods for measuring an abstract feature generally differ depending on what 
more concrete features it consists in, which is not the same from case to case. 
 
We are pulled in two directions here. One: Plump for a false universal 
concretization in order to secure a universal measure. For instance, measure 
‘educational value added’ in new British inner-city academies by counting the 
number of GCSE’s passed at a grade of C or better. Or, devise a measurement 
definition that more correctly captures the abstract feature of interest across its 
various concrete instantiations. The danger then is that the definition will be so 
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 Stopping matters. Increased abstraction generally goes along with increased 
generality. So the more abstract the principles you embrace, the more so-far-
unexplored concrete predictions you are committed to. My own advice has always 
been: Don’t commit to anything more than you need. That is why I have always urged 
sticking to the numerous more concrete, detailed laws that explain – and explain in 
proper detail – the various natural and experimental results we observe rather than 
committing to the super-abstract laws of high theory. 
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abstract that we don’t know what it consists in from situation to situation. For 
example, what constitutes human flourishing differs dramatically according to 
individual circumstances and abilities, natural resources, availability of public 
goods, need, and the like. So the capability approach of Amartya Sen (1985, 
1999) proposes as a measure ‘the number of lives worth living open to the 
individual’. Or, some propose to measure the economic freedom individuals 
enjoy by the size of their choice sets. Neither of these provides much of a clue 
about what we are actually to do to assign numbers or ranks to the individuals to 
be measured.  
 
For EBPP we look to science for advice. Unfortunately when it comes to fixing 
what constitutes abstract features in the concrete, science offers at best rules of 
thumb that are highly defeasible. In particular they are beset by what John Perry 
(2010) dubs ‘the failure of enrichment’: That A consists in M in circumstances C 
does not imply that A consists in M in circumstances C & C’ for every C’ 
consistent with C.  
 
The moral particularism literature is rife with examples where A is a moral 
feature.  
Stuart Hampshire (2000), for instance, describes telling stories to philosophical 
audiences. The stories involve a young intellectual French Fascist, a reader of 
Celine, held by the Free French, whom Hampshire is sent by the British to 
interrogate. The French will execute the young man; but they tell Hampshire that 
he can certainly promise the prisoner – falsely –that he will not be executed in 
exchange for information. Is it acceptable, or even required, for Hampshire to lie 
to the young man? Hampshire tells the story differently on different occasions. 
Often the descriptions can be nested, the more detailed descriptions containing 
the previous, plus more. Depending on how Hampshire tells the story, the 
audience is in general agreement about what he should do – but the verdict 
changes as he shifts from level to level. Enrichment fails.  
 
Hampshire’s stories involve highly abstract features – morally acceptable, 
morally required. Perry’s own example involves specific motions that may or 
may not instantiate his eating a Brussel sprout at his Dewey lecture, depending 
on the level of detail of the description of the circumstances. So the abstract 
feature need not be very abstract at all for the failure of enrichment to appear. 
 
Where then can we find help in science either with the problem of settling on the 
right level of abstraction to find shared explanatory principles or of ascertaining 
what the abstract features in these principles consist in for both study and target 
populations? I don’t know an answer. But I am sure it takes both theory and 
local knowledge, neither of which are much in favor in EBPP communities. 
Without these, scientific studies like RCTs, which are so highly prized for the 
credibility they confer on their results, will not be explanatorily relevant to the 
predictions about what will work for us that we need for practice and policy. And 
I am sure Achinstein is right for these kinds of cases: If explanatory relevance 
goes, so too goes evidential relevance. Then we have no scientific evidence to 
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